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in the complete absence of recollection.
What is required to settle the open ques-
tions is an experimental approach that
yields high confidence familiarity ratings
similar in strength to high confidence rec-
ollection ratings that would permit distin-
guishing separate processes. Under those
conditions, a single-process model would
predict that familiarity and recollection rat-
ings would be highly correlated and would
exhibit a positive linear relationship both
in the perirhinal cortex and hippocampus.
In contrast, a dual-process model would
predict that familiarity and recollection rat-
ings could be decoupled and that familiar-
ity ratings would be positively correlated
with activity in the perirhinal cortex and
recollection ratings would be positively
correlated with hippocampal activity. Until
these issues are addressed, a converging
view in the field is unlikely to emerge.
In this issue of Neuron, Haskins et al.
and Shrager et al. challenge accepted no-
tions about recognition memory and pro-
vide us with new insight into old ques-
tions. Though the two papers come to
different conclusions, they nevertheless
advance our understanding of the MTL
memory system. Whether or not the peri-
rhinal cortex and hippocampus differen-
tially support familiarity and recollection,
it is an important fact that both of these
regions interact to collectively determine
memory confidence. Likewise, it is signif-
icant that familiarity may derive from
bound associations, beyond the familiar-
ity associated with each component,
and that this function can be tied to the
perirhinal cortex. All indications are that
the next decade will produce important
advances in our understanding of the neu-
ral bases of recognition memory. With
apologies to Dorothy Parker, we must ad-
mit that it is possible to teach an old
dogma new tricks.
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An important question in neuroeconomics is how consciousness affects decision making. In this issue of
Neuron, Pessiglione et al. take an initial step toward addressing this question by showing that humans learn
to make optimal choices in the absence of explicit knowledge about key parameters of the decision-making
problem.To the neuroeconomist, animals’ brains
evolved to be sophisticated and effec-
tive decision-making machines. This
view stems from the fact that an animal
that does not make good choices is
less likely to have fit offspring, which sig-
nificantly decreases the chances that its
genes will survive the pressures of Dar-
winian competition. From this perspec-tive, brain function can be understood
in terms of how it helps organisms to
make better decisions. An application
of this logic suggests, for example,
that the nervous system has evolved
perceptual capabilities that are valuable
for decision making (e.g., color vision al-
lows animals to make finer distinctions
between potential food sources) andNeuron 5that cognitive features like declarative
memory enhance our ability to make
sound choices (e.g., remembering
previous bad outcomes in similar choice
situations helps us to avoid making sim-
ilar mistakes). This leads to two impor-
tant open questions: How does con-
sciousness improve decision making?
How does it change the computations9, August 28, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 525
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Previewsthat the brain engages in making a deci-
sion?
In order to think about these questions,
it is useful to have a small conceptual
framework describing a simple decision-
making situation and the computations
that the brain needs to implement to
make a good choice (for a review, see
Rangel et al., 2008). To keep things con-
crete, consider the problem of a rat that
needs to decide whether or not to press
a lever. This is an important decision for
the rat because it has consequences:
sometimes pressing the lever leads to
a tasty food pellet, at other times it leads
to an unpleasant foot shock. The simple
world of the rat can be summarized by
a small number of variables. First is the
state of the world, denoted by s, which
describes the type of situation that the
rat is currently in. Second is the set of po-
tential outcomes that may follow the lever
press, in this simple example o = food,
shock. Third are probability functions
describing the likelihood of the different
outcomes as a function of the action (de-
noted by p(ojL,s) and p(ojNL,s) with L =
press and NL = no press). Note that the
probability of the two outcomes depends
on the state of the world. For example,
the rat might only get shocks when ex-
perimenter A is in the room (one state of
the world) and only pellets with experi-
menter B (another state of the world).
Finally, there is the amount of reward
generated by the outcome that actually
occurs.
What are the computations required to
make good decisions? At the time of
choice, the rat needs to compute a value
for both actions that is equal to the ex-
pected reward that they generate and
then choose the action with the highest
value. These values forecasts, often
called decision values, are denoted by
V(Ljs) and V(NLjs). For simplicity assume
that V(NLjs) = 0 so that the optimal action
for the rat is to press the lever if and only
if V(Ljs) > 0. Note, importantly, that this
value, and thus the optimal decision, de-
pends on the state of the world. For exam-
ple, the optimal decision is to press the
lever with experimenter B and not to do
it with experimenter A. If follows that in
order to assign the right value to the lever
press, the rat must also know, con-
sciously or unconsciously, the state of
the world. Finally, there is the issue of526 Neuron 59, August 28, 2008 ª2008 Elsehow to learn the value V(Ljs). A growing
consensus in the neuroeconomics litera-
ture is that reinforcement learning (RL) al-
gorithms nicely describe the learning pro-
cess (for a review, see Niv and Montague,
2008). The idea behind these algorithms is
simple: the rat learns the value V(Ljs) by
computing a prediction error (PE) that
measures the difference between the re-
ward obtained and the reward expected
in the current state of the world, which is
then added to the value estimate for the
current state of the world. It can be shown
that these algorithms quickly converge to
the true decision values under a very wide
range of circumstances (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). A large number of studies
have shown that a PE signal seems to be
encoded in the firing of dopamine neurons
into the ventral striatum (for a review, see
Balleine et al., 2008).
To understand the role of conscious-
ness in decision making, we need to un-
derstand how it changes these computa-
tions. Pessiglione et al. (2008) in this issue
of Neuron have taken an initial step by
studying humans with functional mag-
netic resonance imaging during an analog
of our rat problem in which individuals do
not have explicit knowledge of the state of
the world. Subjects were asked to decide
whether or not to play a lottery that pays
+1, 0, or 1 pounds as outcomes. The
lottery always pays +1 in state 1, 0 in state
2, and 1 in state 3. The decision-making
problem is not trivial, however, because
the state of the world is announced to
the subjects through the presentation of
a ‘‘fractal stimulus’’ using a visual
backward masking procedure which en-
sures subliminal, but not supraliminal
recognition. Note that this experiment ele-
gantly captures a situation that is perva-
sive in real-life decision making since,
given the limited band-width of con-
sciousness, we are aware of only a small
fraction of the stimuli that affect the
mapping from actions to outcome
probabilities.
The authors asked two basic questions.
First, can subjects learn to make the right
decision in each state of the world? The
answer is yes. With repeated experience,
subjects learned to play the lottery about
65% in the good state but only about
35% in the bad state. This finding is inter-
esting because it suggests that conscious
awareness of the state is not necessaryvier Inc.for making the decision values contingent
on that state. Second, does the brain
encode the PE signal that is critical to
learning to estimate the value of taking
decisions? The authors found a strong
PE signal in the ventral striatum that re-
sembles the one that has been found in
countless previous studies using only su-
praliminal stimuli. This finding is also quite
interesting because it suggests that
RL computations can take place in the
absence of conscious awareness of the
state of the world.
It is important to emphasize that these
findings do not imply that consciousness
is not beneficial for decision making. As
the authors themselves recognize, had
subjects been aware of the state of the
world, they would have learned to imple-
ment the optimal rule 100% within a hand-
ful of trials, which is in fact what was found
in a closely related study (Pessiglione
et al., 2006).
This paper begins a rich research
agenda for neuroeconomics. A natural
next step is to study if subjects can learn
to take the optimal action when they do
not have explicit knowledge of the out-
comes (for example, if monetary prizes
are presented subliminally in a way an-
alogous to the current experiment).
However, the most interesting (and chal-
lenging) experiments will study how con-
scious knowledge of the parameters of
the decision-making situation alter the ba-
sic computations described above. Ex-
amples of the questions that need to be
asked include the following: how are
declarative memories of the outcome of
previous decisions integrated with RL
computations to generate a decision
value? How does conscious awareness
of the state of the world and the outcome
generated by an action alter the com-
puted prediction errors? In fact, given
that as a neuroeconomist I view the brain
essentially as a decision-making ma-
chine, I believe that these studies will
not only improve our understanding of
the neurobiological and computational
basis of choice, but will also provide
invaluable insights into the nature of con-
sciousness.
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Normal aging in humans brings with it
a progressive loss in memory and other
cognitive functions and is often exacer-
bated by diseases such as AD. Creating
hope that this bleak outlook can be chal-
lenged, a growing number of studies sug-
gest that increasing the amount of physi-
cal activity can reduce the risk and slow
the progression of AD (Larson et al.,
2006; Pope et al., 2003). Equally fascinat-
ing have been reports in rodents that dur-
ing normal aging as well as in young
adults, increased activity and environ-
mental enrichment (EE) can lead to an in-
crease in the number, and functional out-
put, of neural stem cell populations in the
brain (van Praag et al., 2005). While the
parallels between the human and rodent
studies are intriguing, more work is nec-
essary to causally link EE and physical
activity with increased neurogenesis and
cognitive function in experimental models
and demonstrate its relevance to humans.
In this issue of Neuron, Choi et al. (2008)
add a number of unexpected findings to
our understanding of EE-induced neuro-
genesis that might have relevance for
aging and possibly AD. They report that
PS1 variants causing early-onset familial
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mouse brain through changes in microglia
that spoil the regenerative benefits asso-
ciated with increased physical activity
and EE.
Stem cells in the adult brain have been
observed in mammals, including humans,
primarily in the subventricular zone (SVZ)
of the lateral ventricles and the subgranu-
lar zone (SGZ) of the hippocampus (Lois
and Alvarez-Buylla, 1993). Adult neural
stem/progenitor cells (NPCs) are a rela-
tively quiescent population that can self-
renew and give rise to more rapidly divid-
ing progenitors that in turn produce
neurons (neurogenesis), as well as astro-
cytes and oligodendrocytes (gliogenesis).
Neurons born in the SGZ can become
granule neurons that integrate into the ex-
isting circuitry of the hippocampus and
have been shown increasingly to influ-
ence learning and memory (Dupret et al.,
2007). Previous studies have also estab-
lished that adult NPCs are localized to
specialized microenvironments—or neu-
rogenic niches—composed of surround-
ing cells including astrocytes, oligoden-
drocytes, microglia, and endothelial
cells, as well as soluble factors, mem-
brane-bound molecule,s and extracellular
matrix molecules. Together, the neuro-
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rate the progression of Alzheimer’s
f Neuron report that the expression
l AD, are capable of mitigating the
l enrichment likely through changes
genic niche is thought to provide the
permissive cues necessary for NPC main-
tenance, differentiation, and neural inte-
gration into the circuitry of the brain
(Alvarez-Buylla and Lim, 2004).
The promise that increased neurogene-
sis in the adult brain could indeed stimu-
late cognitive performance and that EE
or physical activity may be sufficient to
trigger neurogenesis opened the ques-
tions whether adult neurogenesis is im-
paired in illnesses with cognitive dysfunc-
tion such as AD, but also whether EE
could be exploited to stave off age-re-
lated cognitive decline and neurodegen-
eration. To date, proteins involved in the
early-onset genetic forms of AD, including
mutant amyloid precursor protein (APP)
and PS1, have been reported to inter-
fere with NPC function in a number of
mouse models, both under normal and
enriched conditions (Kuhn et al., 2007).
Of special relevance to the current article,
Feng et al. (2001) have shown that tar-
geted deletion of endogenous PS1 in ex-
citatory forebrain neurons in adult mice
inhibits enrichment-induced neurogene-
sis in the dentate gyrus and also leads
to changes in contextual fear memory
functions. This earlier study suggested a
9, August 28, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 527
